I. Introduction
Over the past quarter-century, many countries have experienced deeply divisive and highly destructive con icts, a number of which have then been subject to international intervention and ensuing post-con ict reconstruction initiatives. Most of these international ventures have an in-country presence from the pre-negotiation phase through to the post peace agreement phase, and o en into a development phase, resulting in de facto expansions of international administration in the period a er con ict's formal conclusion.
While societies rarely have the opportunity to revisit and remake their basic social, political, and legal compacts, countries emerging from con ict provide multiple opportunities for transformation on many di erent levels, opportunities uncommon in stable and non-transitional societies. Such potentially transformative moments are so infrequent that their occurrence helps explain our preoccupation with societies that have been deeply and cyclically violent. It also explains why some feminists view transitional opportunities as particularly important to groups that have been marginalized, underrepresented, and discriminated against, even while others are more reserved, wary of the vision of empire that submerges "international con ict feminism" into a broader imperialist project in sites of post-con ict nation building, and caution against over-optimism. Among the many risks for women, there is the ever-present danger that the transformation from "con icted" to "peaceful" risks being partial and exclusionary with the transition process itself operating to cloak women's ongoing repression and inequality. Because of the transformative potential in this moment-for women in particular and for gender relations more generally-and given the critical roles that international interveners can play in these transformations, it is crucial to understand, support and reframe post-con ict reconstruction processes for women. If jus post bellum constitutes, in part, an extension of the just war theory which looks to both "the justness of the war and the justness of the way that war was fought, " a key question for feminist scholars is how and where do women t in the antecedent and constituting doctrines? If for some, jus post requires a peace that is an improvement on the situation prior (to war), or creates some obligations for the parties to a con ict when a state is conquered or defeated, how might such obligations translate into practical e ect for women? Our initial response is skepticism that another normative framework can substantively change the legal or political calculus for women, and fear that it may merely clutter the legal landscape, with the overall outcome of less rather than more legal enforcement for women. Our skepticism is also connected to unearthing the genealogy of the jus ad and jus in traditions, with their consistent lack of attention to gender as a relevant category of analysis or in disaggregating the modalities and costs of war to women. is chapter will explore the utility of a jus post bellum conceptual framework in tackling gender issues in post-con ict transitions. Part I confronts the question of legitimacy-addressing the complexity of utilizing the post-con ict moment to advance the interests of women. Part II addresses the relationship between post-con ict reconstruction, gender justice, and a jus post framework of analysis. We speci cally assess the practices of post-con ict reconstruction where some considerable gender mainstreaming e orts have been made by states and international institutions, speculating whether such form and substance can or should be gra ed onto the jus post approach. Part III is concerned with teasing out what patriarchal baggage resides in the jus post placeholder, and identifying the gender blind spots of this emerging discourse. We address what "work" the concept is doing as identi ed by scholars and policy-makers, and whether the framework attends to the range and forms of issues that have been identi ed as "of concern to women" in the a ermath of armed con ict. Part IV imagines what jus post might add to this work. In conclusion, the chapter adopts a questioning stance on the extent to which a juridical framework comprised of a deep reach into a law of war framework that remain deeply exclusionary for women and whether mindfulness of gender during war's activation, regulation, and closure can mitigate those limitations or transcend them. We are not so naive as to suppose that any legal framework provides a silver bullet solution to regulating women's lives during and a er con ict, but we recognize the "need to examine the distributive and ideological implications of di erent legal architectures. "
in its a ermath, may necessitate di erent solutions and outcomes for women than for the "gender neutral" citizen commonly employed as a the post-con ict Everyman. As scholars have unequivocally a rmed, the idea of justice can be spelled out in many di erent ways, and such distinctions have important consequences in post-con ict societies.
In post-con ict settings the justice in play can be alternatively retributive, restitutive, and compensatory, sometimes with all three combinations working in tandem. A gender perspective asks how, precisely, the distributive weight of justice in any of its forms is allocated. With a focus on transition, Bell and O'Rourke have aptly captured that there is much in particular to be gained from an emphasis on distributive justice for women-a facet frequently overlooked by feminist scholars and post-con ict theorists alike. For that reason, our analysis pays particular attention to the presence or absence of distributive justice in any jus post conceptualization. In general, we start from the premise that close attention to gendered justice is critical to any evaluation of what jus post bellum brings for women.
A. Legitimacy
We acknowledge that our own primary premise-that the post-con ict moment is generally an apt one for examining and potentially improving women's status and daily lives-is not without critics or complexity. First, the international presence within, and concomitant institutional validation of, the post-con ict arena may mean that the will to reform and transform serves to displace wide-ranging questions that would otherwise be asked about the morality of armed con ict itself.
ere are a variety of feminist perspectives on the morality of war, but it remains true that the "popular conception and actual practice alike align women with peace and paci sm. " Feminist scholars have pithily noted in other post-war regulatory contexts that the trade-o on protection in con ict and inclusion in peace may well involve a deeper disengagement from the capacity to critique the engagement in armed con ict itself. e post-con ict setting is one where the impulse to remedy the excesses of war by way of accountability, reform, reparation, and mediation should not obscure the dilemma of validating the forces, institutions, and individuals that have been causal to the creation of communal violence. Articulating this paradox for the advancement of women's interests in the post-con ict moment underscores a broader tension in the relationship between jus ad and jus post bellum .
Second, there is certainly a range of complexities in post-con ict sites, but some of them portend more risk for women. For example, ending con ict o en includes emerging mediated relationships between domestic elites; these can involve dominance, recalibration and perceived increases in or loss of status and political power for women and for minorities. In commenting on nascent e orts by the international community to engineer post-con ict processes aimed toward improving women's lives, we are mindful of the hazards that abound, when, for example, interveners insert themselves into the role of "savior" while essentializing some locals caught in con ictparticularly women-as "victims. "
A parallel, and third critique pinpoints the western imperialism implicit in the wide-ranging enterprise of post-con ict reconstruction. It identi es the reproduction of colonial dialogues in cajoling the local population to move forward in de ned ways, the emphasis on technocratic nation building, and the reproduction of social and political orders without reference to place, population, or local preferences. Michael Ignatie 's celebration of nation building initiatives, for example, described as a "global hegemony whose grace notes are free markets, human rights and democracy, " can also be understood as humanitarian empire building where the bene ts and burdens are invariably distributed inequitably. We argue that those who control and shape these post-con ict processes are typically male and invariably elite local, state, non-state, and international institutional actors. In recent past practice, they have o en systematically erased women as meaningful participants and agents from the post-con ict terrain.
Fourth, when international actors become aware of women's e orts to be included in con ict ending processes and acknowledge their obligations to assist with that inclusion, there is evidence of a pattern that shunts women into so roles as participants within civil Citing George W. Bush on the reconstruction of Germany and Japan a er the Second World War, "A er defeating enemies, we did not leave behind occupying armies, we le behind constitutions and parliaments. " Bass, "Jus Post Bellum" (n. 4) 385.
Makau Mutua, "Savages, Victims, society movements rather than at the negotiation table itself. While recent e orts to include women in post-con ict negotiation processes have succeeded in increasing the number of women present, there is still marginalization of these women, who have undertaken sometimes extraordinary e orts to become visible to the decision-makers in the transitional process.
Like Vatanparast writing in this volume, we are concerned that jus post bellum framing allows for manipulation by elite actors and norm entrepreneurs, in tandem with embedding and legitimating neo-colonial projects through law. We assert, nonetheless, that it is critical to harness the potential to create opportunities and capture improvements for women that might otherwise never exist. In this e ort, one might characterize our approach as deeply pragmatic. While all interventionist approaches have obvious drawbacks (lacking, for example, legitimacy and longevity unless there is local ownership and "buy in"), not intervening at all, doing so too so ly, or placing "women's issues" too far down on the agenda of intervention and post-con ict priorities also bears signi cant risk. Inaction during transition can leave women at a loss for substantial rights protection at a time when the rights of individuals are most likely to be considered and formulated or reformulated.
If a jus post bellum framework is one that optimizes and makes clearer the legal and political frames that apply in post-con ict settings, an important dimension of its utility to women would be the extent to which any such consolidation recognizes how con ict a ects men and women di erently, and prioritizes equality gains for women. Similarly, if the goal of a jus post bellum framework is coherency and completeness of the post-con ict reconstruction terrain, then an obvious set of questions arises as to the comparative bene ts of coherency versus fragmentary legal systems. As one of the authors has asked elsewhere, "do the presumed bene ts of a unitary, cohesive system of international law really accrue to women? When fragmentation occurs and legal regimes multiply do women bene t? If so, how?" Feminists and those interested in gender in post-con ict would do well to pause and re ect on the state of the jus post bellum eld, and consider: How best to proceed? How can feminists avoid the constant di culty of catching up while an emerging eld expands? How could a feminist vision of jus post bellum be framed that is not only responsive to expansion and opportunity but could actually frame the basis of engagement on its own terms? How would a Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn, On the Frontlines (n. 17) ch. 10; Dina Haynes, Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, and Naomi Cahn, "Women in the Post-con ict Process: Reviewing the Impact of Recent UN Actions in Achieving Gender Centrality" (2012) 11 Santa Clara Law Review 101.
See Johanna E. Bond, "Gender, Discourse, and Customary Law in Africa" (2010) 83 Southern California Law Review 509 (2010).
See also Haynes, " e Deus ex Machina Descends" (n. 17) 13 (discussing "governance by at"). See e.g. eodora-Ismene Gizelis, "A Country of eir Own: Women and Peacebuildin g " (2011) 28 Con ict Management and Peace Science 522, 524 ("UN operations can do better to ensure successful long-term peace than purely domestic alternatives and international involvement without the UN").
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, "International Law, Gender Regimes and Fragmentation: 1325 and Beyond" in Cecilia M. Bailliet (ed.), Non State Actors, So Law and Protective Regimes (Cambridge University Press 2012).
On the "state of the eld" in transitional justice discourses, see generally Christine Bell, "Transitional Justice, Interdisciplinarity, and the State of the 'Field' or 'Non-Field' " (2009) feminist vision incorporate non-hegemonic practices and be aware of the complexities and contradictions of its own dominant discourses?
B. Post-con ict reconstruction: language and motif
If one aspect of the jus ad bellum motif is an extension of justness into the post-con ict phase, the quality and outcomes of post-con ict re-construction then falls squarely into a jus post bellum framework. Post-con ict reconstruction can be said to describe the collection of programs created and administered by various international organizations and their local partners in the period immediately following the formal legal conclusion of armed con ict. ere is frequently, but not inevitably, an overlap with the application of local and international transitional justice mechanisms and processes in play. In trying to understand how jus post di ers or compares to post-con ict reconstruction, we can look to Larry May's concept of jus post , which focuses on the "rebuilding" of a state. From a methodological point of view, we start with some linguistic parsing. e idea of " re " building presumes a putting back together of that which is broken or destroyed, as does " re " construction. It is di cult to argue with the urgent necessity to bring order and structure back to societies whose physical and social infrastructure has been destroyed by communal violence. Yet, the comforting implication of the terminology presumes a going to back to things as they were before, and this is where "post-con ict reconstruction" frequently falls short. First, the call to reconstruct the pre-con ict order can be a slippery slope for women, risking a return to status quo ante. Presumptions of the status quo ante also are largely played out on realist terms as a politics of power, security, and order.
is approach has consistently ignored what Porter has termed a "politics of compassion, " in which there is attentiveness to the needs of vulnerable persons who have experienced su ering, an active listening to the voices of the vulnerable and open, compassionate and appropriate responses to particular needs.
And yet, much of post-con ict work is deaf to determining what women and other vulnerable persons who have su ered want in terms of the post-con ict justice devised and meted out for them by local and international elites. For example, in a study undertaken in the eastern Congo, more than 2,600 people (half of whom were women) stated that their highest individual priorities were peace, security, and livelihood concerns (money, education, food, and health). Transitional justice, which has been historically premised on achieving accountability and underpinned by the notion of "punishing those responsible" was ranked as the eighteenth priority. e authors of the study concluded that "transitional justice must be integrated within a broader social, political, and economic transition to provide for basic needs and protection. " A similar survey in Uganda, conducted shortly a er a peace agreement was signed there, found that survey participants' highest priorities were health (45 percent), peace, education, and livelihood issues (food and land), with seeking justice, at a mere three percent, as a much lower priority. Indeed, when asked to consider what should be done for the victims of wartime violence, 51.8 percent of the respondents said that victims should be given nancial compensation and 8.2 percent said victims should be given cattle and goats (for a total of 60 percent of nancial or material compensation), with only 1.7 percent indicating that victims should be given "justice. " When women in refugee camps in Darfur, who had previously experienced sexual violence, were asked what they needed to move forward, they replied "food security. "
Empirically it seems that a substantial percentage of women deem (when asked), that justice in post-con ict contexts includes not just criminal and civil accountability (rights-based justice) but also assistance of the kind traditionally associated with development aid. is assistance, which falls somewhere between the mandates of those engaged in humanitarian aid and development, and which elsewhere we have described as "social services justice, " is received more in the form of "healing" justice, because it focuses on providing critical social services to facilitate all aspects of post-con ict reconstruction.
As our work and that of other scholars has noted, con icts sometimes produce surprising results for women. ey are paradoxically contexts in which the social ux of violence provides access to public space, working opportunities, augmented political responsibilities, social activism, and greater gender equality. e rub may come at the end of con ict, in the jus post phase when women see the gains that they have made through a time of social ux lost in the re-construction and re-building phase. Hence, we approach "re"-building with some gender-aware caution, and underscore our position that the re-distributive elements of any gender justice analysis demands nuanced recognition that con icts can produce some gendered resource equalization, which may be lost by crude post-con ict liberal market driven "reforms. " See e.g. Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn, On the Frontlines (n. 17) ch. 10. It also underscores a broader analytical point by feminist scholar Danielle Poe that the failure of just war theory to account for the fullness of war's costs has broader implications, not least that an ethic of di erence ought to infuse our understanding Second, as a construct for improving women's lives during and a er the political, economic, and social transitions that o en follow war, post-con ict reconstruction has some evident weak points. For example, it is distinctly "emergency" focused.
e people who work in the organizations and agencies post-con ict have o en been present during the war and into the early days a er formal cessation of hostilities. As a consequence, they are accustomed to operating in emergency mode, and so fail to adjust to longer-term strategizing and thinking even long a er the emergency phases have passed. As a result of this incessant focus on reacting, rather than planning, and reacting only to the next urgent issue risking security, women's needs o en gure in marginal and highly stereotyped ways. Most o en this manifests as a sole focus on physical protection of women, and even then, as we have argued elsewhere, not o en well done.
is sort of stylized approach fails to take account of "an ethics of sexual di erence" in the post-war moment and its implications for the ordering of post-con ict settings.
ird, the outlines for most post-con ict programs are negotiated during peace talks where women have historically had scant representation. Fourth, the programs de ned during the peace accords, and re ned by the international organizations carrying them out, typically focus heavily on civil and political rights, which may not align with women's priorities for post-con ict gains, and may result in skewed distributional e ects, with perceptible gender e ects.
Ben-Porath, among others, has argued cogently that an ethics of care and dependence, if fused into the post-war arena, would fundamentally realign our understanding and re-prioritization of jus post bellum . In this thinking, post-war deliberations should include relational considerations and the interconnectedness of responsibilities to address the consequences of armed con ict. Such theorization seeks to mitigate the perceived harms of humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, and international administration, and to fundamentally realign how we conceive substantively and procedurally of post-war reconstruction. But it remains unclear how, if at all, a jus post bellum analysis shi s some of the identi ed challenges and avoids the stated pitfalls. Moreover, we remain unconvinced that the post-con ict terrain requires a new conceptual placeholder of jus post bellum to do the work, rather than to address these issues of substance and process in their distinct and di erent legal and political elds. 
C. Gender centrality
Having introduced the notion that con ict a ects both men and women, but sometimes di erently, we want to a rm the importance of a gender lens focused on post-con ict processes, because the value of a gendered assessment remains contested. In the legal and political space of ending or transmuting con ict, women still struggle to assert the magnitude of issues that a ect them directly. ey remain subordinated by dominant discourses that minimize or ignore the value of placing the needs and views of women at the center of the conversation about ending violent communal behaviors, even though such placement is absolutely central to ending societal violence. It needs constant restatement that women are the group most historically marginalized and excluded from the peacemaking and peacebuilding processes across all jurisdictions and con icts.
ere are well-acknowledged gender gaps in existing legal frameworks applicable to post-con ict settings, including the law of armed con ict, international criminal law, and international human rights law. In all these sites, signi cant but incomplete conceptual and practical work has been undertaken (and remains ongoing) to address de cits, incentivize compliance, and shore-up enforcement. It is insu cient, but it is a start. Given the relative youth of such e orts, we underscore our skepticism that such a variety of legal and political responses can be fully embedded and resolved in emerging jus post bellum discourses, or that there has been a substantial commitment by the norm entrepreneurs in the eld to frame them with an embedded sense of gender justice.
We assert, instead, that applying a gender lens to con ict and its a ermath, regardless of the doctrine employed, helps us recognize that understanding women's needs must become central to con ict resolution, peacekeeping, reconstruction, and reconciliation e orts. As we have argued elsewhere, merely integrating gender practices into post-con ict process already underway is insu cient unless gender is incorporated into all aspects and levels of the newly developing or rehabilitating state. It is also insu cient to rely solely on formal legal norms alone, be they jus post driven or any other, to confront the gender inequalities, violence, and discrimination that women may have experienced during con ict, or for women to be given a place merely within civil society post-con ict institutions. Law alone cannot do the work.
Rather, a broadly framed set of imperatives is required which includes, but does not rely solely on, legal reform to address harm and exclusion. For example, where women have predominantly come into view in recent post-con ict legal arenas it has been as an instrumental means to hold war crimes perpetrators accountable for sexual violence. While not undermining per se the credibility and value of such accountability mechanisms, it should be clear that this slice of woman-centered concern limits what we understand about the gendered dynamics of any con ict and its post-con ict processes and laws. Moreover, we cannot hope to dislodge practices of violence towards women (before, during, and a er con ict) unless we are prepared to confront a broader array of socially embedded violence.
III. What Work Does Jus Post Bellum
Do in Post-Con ict Settings?
Jus post bellum can be regarded as a reasonably new conceptual placeholder containing the idea that there is an emerging and coherent body of legal norms applicable to the post-con ict arena. In addressing the notion of an existing and consistent notion of "justice" in the post-con ict showground-we must rst generally ascertain what norms we have now, how e ective they are, and what augmentation, if any, is required. In this vein, we pay particular attention to the danger that jus post bellum "is not a properly universal [concept] as its development has privileged the experiences of men over those of women. " In this context, we draw on a substantial strain of feminist analysis directed at critique and reformulation of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello frameworks. Second, we are acutely aware of a substantial literature that con rms the search for universal, abstract, and hierarchical standards as associated with and driven by masculine modes of reasoning, with distinct application to universalist and absolutist legal frameworks in international law. ere is an acute hazard, then, that jus post bellum also bestows privilege to a set of norms that capture what is important to men about justice in post-con ict settings, but may not equally address what is important to women. Finally, re ecting on the gendered dimensions of any post bellum framework, some obvious methodological questions arise. ey include questioning whether gender analysis emerges in response to an existing set of generally agreed norms, which means that the discourse presumes its own gender neutrality, but also, because it is established, that gender consciousness is to be integrated from the outside in. See, inter alia, Laura Sjoberg and Jessica Peet, "A(nother) Dark Side of the Protection Racket" (2011) 13 International Feminist Journal of Politics 163; Eide, " ' e Stigma of Nation' " (n. 6).
Eide, " ' e Stigma of Nation' " (n. 6) 56, drawing on Carol Gilligan, In a Di erent Voice: Psychological eory and Women's Development (Harvard University Press 1982) Feminist scholars have frequently paused to re ect on the "gender" of international law doctrines and to wonder at the "structure of concept detailed by international law scholars. " is article follows that line of inquiry. See Charlesworth and Chinkin, " e Gender of Jus Cogens" (n. 53); in the context of the doctrine of self-determination, feminist scholars have noted how, for example, "the oppression of women has never been considered relevant to the validity of [a group's] claim or to the form self-determination should take. " Christine Chinkin, "A Gendered perspective to the Use of Force in International Law" (1992) 12 Australian Yearbook of International Law 279 (1992); Charlesworth and Chinkin, " e Gender of Jus Cogens" (n. 53) 73.
It has been argued, for example, that " [o] ne important di erence between jus ad bellum and jus in bello on the one hand, and jus post bellum on the other, is that the law is fairly settled as to the prior two categories. " is position has some derivative consequences, and the presumption of settled law comes with some substantial gender baggage. First, women's interests have fared notoriously badly in the regulation of violent con icts between states. Armed confrontation between states has generally been carried out by male combatants (with exceptions, as we acknowledge). e applicable laws of war were also generally constructed from the vista of the soldier's need for ordered rules within which to wage war on behalf of the state. Historically the focus lay in de ning the elds of action for the soldier (including exclusions of acts and targets) rather than on recognizing harms with consequent liabilities caused by state actors during con ict. All this in turn meant that until relatively recently, the locales and personalities of injury towards women in situations of con ict were places where neither law nor recorded narrative entered.
Second, the lack of harm elaboration means any presumption that jus ad bellum and jus in bello adequately address the violence lawfully permitted in war starts from a gendered blind spot. Logically, if the legal terrain of jus post bellum follows from the frameworks of jus ad bellum and jus in bello , then one must, from a gendered perspective, account for the gendered limitations of the derivative frameworks. e degree of gender exclusion, blind spots, and omissions will invariably a ect how one quanti es the value of the jus post bellum discourse to addressing the gendered dimensions of armed con ict and its a ermath.
Our primary concern is that jus post bellum discourse has emerged, as did its predecessor frameworks, without conscious attention being paid to gender as a constitutive dimension of post-con ict arenas, institutions and activities. Hence, if it is to add anything to the post-con ict terrain for women, it must start by paying analytical attention to the degree (if any) of gender consciousness and gender sensitivity in articulation of relevant and cohering norms. Larry May asks who is the intended person addressed by jus post bellum principles? His attention is directed to the "average citizen, " who has little say in how wars are mounted or in the morality of a state's conduct. But there is no such thing as the "average citizen, " and he certainly does not represent women. We suggest that close attention to the sex and the intersectionalities that accompany the citizen subject make a profound di erence to determining the views of this "average citizen, " for whom post-con ict laws and constitutions are written and institutions are built, both in respect of the conduct of war and its a ermath.
ere is more to be said here, but the short form of what we would propose starts from the premise that the building blocks of jus post require a jus ad and a jus in -this is not per se controversial and is generally presumed by liberal approaches to jus post discourse. However, if we interrogate the solidity of the building blocks constituting May, A er War Ends (n. 27) 5 Foremost among these is Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (n. 51). While Walzer does not address jus post bellum directly, he clearly a rms that there is justice in the goals of war, from which follows the presumption that the post-con ict execution of these goals weigh in any judgment of the war's overall justice. these two frameworks from a gender perspective, namely the extent to which either body of norms takes account of gendered roles, relationships and structures and the consequent harms that may befall both women and men in situations of armed conict on account of gender, then some foundational shakiness is evident. A number of choices follow. e rst is to recognize the genealogical de ciencies and to construct jus post bellum as a transformative framework that fully integrates gender analysis and speci city into its norm creation and consolidation. We do not here attempt to advance such gender integration into jus post bellum , but instead acknowledge that attempts have been made by feminist political theorists to develop a gendered conceptualization of the doctrine to varied success.
e direction of much of the existing theory work is to locate an alternative vision of jus post in a feminist ethic of care, compassion, and relational dependency. Leaving aside the signi cant challenges of essentialism in a feminist ethic of care approach, our goal here is not to translate the corpus of legally based post-con ict capacity building through the prism of relational autonomy and care, though our views on social services justice, articulated elsewhere and noted above, could be viewed as one instrumentalization of this approach.
e second choice is to work within the status quo, with its inherent limitations, but to utilize the tools that have emerged to integrate a gendered analysis (the United Nations Security Council Resolutions, international criminal law, gendered programming and development awareness), and attempt to move forward, integrating those tools into the existing framework. As we have argued elsewhere, the international community has not yet successfully addressed women and gender in its humanitarian interventions or its post war operations. Nevertheless, as we have also elsewhere articulated, there is some momentum being created that indicates that gender is squarely on the agenda of these actors. We believe that putting some pressure on the reformist impulses currently underway, set forth in the next section, is preferable to beginning anew, unless the "new" framework promises to centralize gender into its essence, and ful lls that promise through implementation.
IV. Current International Legal Responses to the Gender Dimensions of Con ict and Post-Con ict Processes
In the past 30 years, the international institutional infrastructure (comprised largely of the UN and other international agencies and donors) has sought to respond to intra-state, and, more frequently, inter-state, con ict through interventions designed to secure peace and advance related goals, including regional security, economic stability, and the recognition of human rights for all individuals. e process of "securing" peace See, Sjoberg "Paradox of Double E ect" (n. 52); Eide, " ' e Stigma of Nation' " (n. 6); Ben-Porath, "Care Ethics and Dependence" (n. 45).
On relational feminist theory, see Robin West, Caring for Justice (NYU Press 1999). Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn, On the Frontlines (n. 17) ch. 11. Haynes et al., "Women in the Post-con ict Process" (n. 20). Haynes, Ní Aoláin, and Cahn, On the Frontlines (n. 17) 17. Haynes et al., "Women in the Post-con ict Process" (n. 20).
has no bright lines or demarcations, and so guaranteeing immediate peace o en leads to a longer-term phase of stabilizing the country through post-con ict reconstruction processes and development. Decisions about what is included in, or le out of, post bellum processes are o en made early during the peace negotiation phases. Historically, the actors involved in responding to violent con ict, securing peace, and reconstructing nations torn apart by con ict have failed to take into account the experiences and relevant contribution to peacemaking that women may have. Recent combined legal and political e orts on multiple fronts, including treaty recognition of gender-based violence, robust jurisprudence from regional human rights treaties, and embedded policy initiatives through UN agencies (some newly created to address these issues), have given rise to a larger discussion about the impact of con ict on women as a distinct group. Over the past half century, international actors, including and sometimes led by UN agencies speci cally tasked with assessing the condition and status of women, began recognizing that women were excluded from many of the processes devised to end con ict and secure peace, and that their inclusion was desirable towards the UN objective of peace and security. In some sense therefore, without ignoring the pitfalls of international con ict feminism as a "player in global power politics, " there are concrete and identi able gains to be had for women. Including the presence of women in meaningful ways and securing their visibility in the transitional justice and post-con ict reconstruction frameworks that have emerged in recent decades creates a chance of concretely improving the post-con ict lives of women.
In particular, one relatively recent change is the UN Security Council's passage of Resolution 1325, an initiative to "mainstream" women into post-con ict processes. We can see various rationales for the adoption of SCR 1325, including: (1) consolidation of the Security Council's legitimacy (albeit via "so " law) a er the peacekeeping debacles in both Rwanda and Bosnia/Herzegovina; (2) the patriarchal political capital to be gained by action with respect to women's rights a er the same two human rights crises revealed systematic rape and sexual violence of women; and (3) a response to the concerted campaign by international women's NGOs (the governance feminism shi by the international feminist movement to gain UN Security Council access), insisting that the Security Council take a normative stand on women's rights in the context of armed con ict.
Over a period of 10 years, the Security Council adopted ve more resolutions on women, peace, and security, aiming to "mainstream" women into all aspects of peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peacekeeping operations. On the plus side, the adoption of these Security Council Resolutions formally acknowledged and addressed, at least rhetorically, the need to incorporate women into processes intended to secure peace. Also, because the UN Security Council is recognized and understood as the key global actor in the security arena, an actor whose resolutions are both determinative and binding as legal, political, and normative pronouncements, it was a powerful signal that these dimensions of harm to women were to be taken seriously by states and international institutions.
While we hope that Resolution 1325 and its successor resolutions bear fruit, we are mindful that tackling a highly selected menu of "women's issues, " (with a primary and excessive focus on sexual violence) allows states adopting the resolution to maintain a comfortable and familiar role-as patriarchal protectors of women. Bearing in mind the multiple dimensions of justice at play in such contexts, it remains striking the distributive justice remains well o the menu of issues and solutions to the causes conducive to the production of extreme violence against women in con ict situations, even as international institutions profess greater engagement with the harms experienced by women in war.
Assuming that a particular set of issues perceived to most acutely a ect women are at least formally on the international agenda now, we are as yet unclear what the jus post bellum framework can do for women
V. What Jus Post Bellum Might Add
e answer to whether the jus post bellum construct might add anything to the improvement of women's lives in the a ermath of war depends both on (a) what women want (e.g. how one would measure and implement the justice demanded by women when asked), and (b) whether the conceptual and practical framework o ered by jus post bellum o ers new tools to address complex legal and political issues.
May suggests that there are six key principles of the jus post bellum : reconciliation, retribution, rebuilding, restitution, reparations, and proportionality. Other scholars have argued that jus post bellum constitutes an umbrella concept that reaches to the law of peace, the law of occupation, the responsibility to protect, emergency law, transitional justice, and peacebuilding. Each of these legal realms has an enormous reach in its own right, and several facets of these legal elds remain under construction, or UNSC Res. 1325 (n. 19) 2. See also Otto, " e Exile of Inclusion" (n. 13) (discussing additional factors for the adoption of SCR 1325 at this particular time). See also Sjoberg and Peet, "A(nother) Dark Side of the Protection Racket" (n. 54) 176 discussing how "belligerents justify wars as necessary to protect 'their women and children' both as innocent people themselves and as a symbol of the purity of the nation and the state. "
May, A er War Ends (n. 27). See e.g. Jennifer Easterday, " Jus Post Bellum in the Age of Terrorism: Remarks by Jennifer Easterday" (2012) 106 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 335 (arguing that "One of [ jus post bellum 's] central goals is the establishment and maintenance of sustainable peace. e jus post bellum framework o ers a way of unifying and reconceptualizing overlaps in laws that apply in post-con ict situations. It provides relational cohesion to its underlying laws and norms, and a basis for assigning responsibility for post-con ict obligation").
are challenged to remain relevant in the ever-changing terrain of armed con ict itself.
ere remains dispute among scholars as to the "known" nature of jus post bellum and the certainty of what its application means and requires.
We caution that women might be particularly wary of hanging any hopes on a norm "under construction, " not least because it remains unclear to what degree and extent the concerns and needs of women are addressed by a body of norms designed to "bring together" existing legal practices, irrespective of the identi ed limitations of existing doctrines. ere has been little if any engagement by feminist legal scholars with the jus post bellum arena, yet as noted throughout this article and articulated by us elsewhere, the post-con ict arena is axiomatically relevant to women.
ere are collective interests at play in the a ermath of con ict for women that cut across jurisdictions and contexts. Some of these interests might be addressed by the institution of laws or accountability mechanisms, but others require multiple tools and processes to be simultaneously in e ect, for example: systemic or pre-con ict physical and sexual violence; psychosocial and physical concerns impacting refugees and displaced persons; humanitarian aid dependency; lack of access to social and economic goods on an equal basis; exclusion from political processes; and lower legal, social, and economic status.
A separate set of issue arises as to the identities and motives of the entrepreneurs advancing a theory and practice of jus post bellum . Does the gender of the norm entrepreneurs matter? If so, how should feminist analysis and knowledge practices be included as a new doctrine comes into play? Feminist scholars have revealed the masculinity of the international legal order, showing how it produces hierarchy, exclusivity and reproduces public/private dichotomies that rarely work to women's advantage. Hilary Charlesworth de ly captured an almost entirely one-sided conversation between feminist international law scholars and the mainstream, in which feminist theorizing and insight "is an optional extra, a decorative frill on the edge of the discipline. " ere is evident pessimism about the mainstream indi erence to feminist interventions, and deepening unease that feminist scholarship will remain con ned to backwater status no matter the legal doctrine employed, if women are not centralized into the creation and implementation of the relevant doctrine.
As the train of jus post bellum thinking departs from the station, the same kinds of dynamics appear to be in play.
is is not to say that feminist scholars merely cry foul when a new theory makes an appearance without reference to women or to women's experiences. Rather, it is to say that critical engagement mandates that women are central in the production of norms, underscoring that the social construction of gendered norms is well understood and continues to reproduce itself in new norm creation. e unconscious presumption that the gender neutral Everyman employed when working out a new doctrine will meet the needs of both men and women no longer su ces.
When we insist that women be central to the creation of a new doctrine, we also wish to underscore the imperative of considering gender as one of many intersectionalities. Jus post bellum is a ripe eld for intersectional analysis. Employing Larry May's "six normative principles of jus post bellum : rebuilding, restitution, reconciliation, restitution, and reparation as well as proportionality, " for example, one can adduce a set of speci c sites in which the dimensions of sex, age, sexual orientation, class, religion, ethnic identity and multiple other identities come together to shape individual and collective memory, articulation, and placement in the post-con ict site. Inevitably, identifying what women want and need in the post-con ict context is a delicate business. Any gender analysis must be particularly attuned to the intersectionality of women's experiences, not only conscious of their gender but also of their race, religion, family status, economic background, sexual orientation, and so forth. Despite this multiplicity of intersecting characteristics, women's complex and highly di erentiated roles have too o en, when thought of at all, been collapsed by the social and political dynamics of armed conict. Accepting and accommodating a diverse range of roles for women in war and post-war facilitates a greater conceptual and practical understanding of the lived intersectionalities of most women's lives. An intersectional analysis integrated to any jus post bellum framework would both complicate and deepen the subjects of action in the post-con ict setting.
VI. Conclusion
What is the right way to end a war? In a way that o ers respite, and ideally improvement, in the lives of all of its citizens, not just some. For women, the transformation of a state from "con icted" to "peaceful" risks being partial and exclusionary. e transition process itself may operate to cloak women's ongoing repression and inequality. Applying the gender lens is critical to ensuring the e ectiveness of policies and practices involved in ending con icts and ensuring that they do not recur. Without this attention, traditional gender dichotomies may be further entrenched and exacerbated during times of extreme violence and extended in the post-con ict phase.
We re ect on what a feminist vision of jus post bellum would look like. A feminist positioning would give prominence to a range of harms identi ed by those socially subjected to armed con ict and its a ermath. ese would include retaining or
Of course the inclusion of one paper in a collective devoted to identifying a feminist perspective may be seen to do some work in closing the gap.
May, A er War Ends (n. 27).
recapturing the agency of the subjects by including them in the process; advancing security from violence, discrimination, and oppression; promoting sexual health and reproductive freedom. It would also require a non-hierarchical vision of legal norms within the jus post analysis-one that does not automatically place political and civil rights at a hierarchical advantage. Drawing on the previous work of Charlesworth and Chinkin, we reiterate that a feminist rethink could also undo the public/private division that has de ned the identi cation and harnessing of and accountability for harms that occur in situations of armed con ict, but as yet we see no promise of a feminist rethink coming through adopting the jus post bellum framework. Concentrating more rigorously on understanding how women experience harm and the manner in which law can facilitate and compound extremities of social and personal experience is a starting point for a female-centered understanding of con ict and the harms it causes to women. More concretely, we would look beyond harms to the body and think in broader terms. Only then can the full scope of harms experienced by women be adequately addressed by a post-con ict vision that is transformative.
Perhaps it matters less what we call this work, or the doctrine and theory under which it is done. What matters most is answering the questions-is the post-con ict moment one in which to attempt to improve women's status, power, and daily lives? Are the existing hard and so laws and processes meeting those needs? We think all post-con ict moments are moments in which women's lives might be exponentially improved, because it is during this transitional moment-in which constitutions and laws are written and rewritten, in which economic projects are undertaken, in which labor markets are rede ned, in which educational systems are built-that opportunities may open up for women.
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